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The Steep Costs of Using Noncumulative Zoning to
Preserve Land for Urban Manufacturing
Roderick M. Hills, Irt & David Schleichertt
In cities around the country, huge swaths of property in desirable locations house
only empty warehouses, barely-used shipping facilities, and heavily subsidized industri-
al-age factories, often right across the street from high-end condos and office buildings.
The reason is a widely-used, but poorly understood form of local industrial policy
known as non-cumulative zoning. In contrast with traditional Euclidean zoning, in
which manufacturing uses were prohibited in residential areas but not vice versa, areas
that are zoned non-cumulatively allow only manufacturing uses and bar any residential
(and sometimes even commercial uses) of property. The arguments for non-cumulative
zoning are always the same: Cities seek to (a) reduce the degree to which urban manu-
facturers are held responsible for nuisance and (b) subsidize urban manufacturing by
reducing the competition for land and hence reducing the price.
In this Article, we argue that non-cumulative zoning is an idea whose time has
passed, if there ever was a convincing case for it at all. The two major justifications for
non-cumulative zoning are flawed, and alternative means could achieve the same ends
with fewer costs. The large number of nuisance claims engendered by urban manufactur-
ing could be addressed by creating a "right to stink" in certain zones, allowing residential
and commercial users to move into these zones but prohibiting them from suing manufac-
turers who are not violating regulatory laws. As for the second manufacturer-subsidizing
justification, subsidies cannot be justified in terms of a subsidizing city's own welfare un-
less the external "agglomeration" benefits of manufacturing exceed the cost of the subsidy
to the city. Moreover, the broader social perspective also requires that some cities are better
able to capture those agglomeration benefits than others; meaning that competition be-
tween jurisdictions could result in total increases in wealth. However, non-cumulative
zoning is unlikely to achieve either local or broader social efficiency. Its scope is not close-
ly tied to any theory of external benefit; it encourages the inefficient use of land and the
substitution of land for other inputs, and it hides the true cost of urban manufacturing
subsidies from the public. If urban manufacturing must be subsidized, a direct cash subsi-
dy system would be preferable, particularly if it could be funded directly from taxes on the
increased value of land caused by the removal of a non-cumulative zoning designation.
INTRODUCTION
We both now live or have lived in Brooklyn, in a neighborhood
that real estate brokers call "Cobble Hill," just a few blocks from the
East River. The location allows you simultaneously to get some exer-
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cise and study land use regulation by taking a run along the South
Brooklyn waterfront. If you run south along Columbia Heights and
Van Brunt, you enjoy one of the city's best views of the Upper Bay and
Manhattan: just by turning your head, you can see a stretch of river
from the Brooklyn Bridge to the Verrazano Bridge, encompassing the
towers of the Financial District, the Statue of Liberty, Governor's Island,
and Staten Island. It is not far from Cobble Hill's and Carroll Gardens's
popular restaurants and caf6s, and the area received some press when
MTV's The Real World filmed a season from a building nearby.' The
land seems like a prime spot for a condo with a view.
But the buildings enjoying this magnificent vista are often aban-
doned or underused, frequently consisting of apparently empty ware-
houses, some usually idle container cranes, and crumbling concrete
lots surrounded by chain-link fence. The waterfront still has a couple
of significant industrial employers. On Piers Seven through Eleven, for
instance, American Stevedoring leases land from the Brooklyn Port
Authority, although the rent is apparently paid from funds supplied by
the state, and the cocoa beans that the company unloads are barged
over to Port Newark, New Jersey.' The Golten Marine Company op-
erates a maritime repair facility next door to American Stevedoring.
But heavy maritime industry has mostly left the area: The two most
conspicuous businesses are the Fairway Grocery and the new IKEA,
both commercial retailers in Red Hook that cater to city residents.
(IKEA runs a free water taxi from Wall Street to draw in customers.)
These retailers are surrounded by the skeletons of crumbling ware-
houses and defunct cranes, the relics of Brooklyn's manufacturing
past that long ago departed for New Jersey with the container revolu-
tion. Indeed, IKEA actually created a sort of break-bulk museum on
the waterfront promenade behind its store, incorporating some of the
old cranes and docks, complete with informational plaques.
The absence of housing from New York's waterfront is, in large
part, the result of zoning. Since 1961, the city's zoning resolution has
barred residential uses from manufacturing zones, and 30 percent of
the city's shoreline is presently zoned for industrial use.! Such "non-
I See Ginia Belafonte, The Show that Put the 'Real' in Reality TV, NY Times C1 (Jan 7,
2009); Jeff Vandam, Where Tugboats Chug and Ikea's Coming, NY Times sec 11 at 9 (Mar 11,
2007) (describing the developing restaurant row in Red Hook that is close to Carroll Gardens).
2 See Ali T. Winston, Dredging for Dollars, NJ Star-Ledger 14 (Apr 27, 2008); Charles V.
Bagli, Lease Ends Uncertainty for Red Hook Cargo Docks, NY Tumes B3 (Apr 25,2008).
3 New York City Department of City Planning, Executive Summary, New York City Com-
prehensive Waterfront Plan: Reclaiming the City's Edge *68 (1992), online at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/htmli/pub/wLshtml (visited Nov 8,2009).
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cumulative" manufacturing zones (that is, zones that do not allow the
"cumulation" of uses less noxious than industry in manufacturing
zones) bar housing in a considerable part of New York City. According
to Regina Armstrong's study, the city zoned 22,500 acres for industrial
development to the exclusion of residential uses in 2005.4
Why not allow residential uses in these manufacturing zones?
Advocates of noncumulative zoning typically offer two general sorts
of ways in which residential users could threaten industrial uses. First,
residential users are said to burden industry with complaints and nuis-
ance lawsuits. Keeping residences out of industrial zones is a regulato-
ry analogue to a "coming to the nuisance" defense in tort law, preserv-
ing industrial investments from encroachments by sensitive users.
Second, residential users outbid industrial users for land, driving in-
dustry out of the city in search of cheaper real estate. By excluding
residential uses, noncumulative zoning protects urban industry from
these threats of escalating real estate prices.
As we suggest below, neither of these arguments are compelling
reasons to exclude residential or commercial uses from manufacturing
zones. Industry could be protected from nuisance litigation by giving
industrial users a defense of regulatory compliance, and industry would
be better subsidized through tax credits or outright budget outlays than
through zoning benefits. Noncumulative zoning is indefensible as a ra-
tional mechanism for attracting or retaining manufacturing enterprises
that generate some spillover benefit for the city, and generates costs
that are not included in a city's public budget and hence are hidden
from ordinary group competition for scarce public resources.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF NONCUMULATIVE ZONING
Prior to World War II, most zoning ordinances followed the mod-
el of the Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty' by providing for "cumula-
tive" or "inclusive" zoning districts defined by a hierarchy of uses. The
highest use was the single-family home, and land zoned for such homes
excluded most other uses, including multifamily residential uses. Land
zoned for uses deemed to be more obnoxious than the single-family use
would permit single-family homes as well as all uses deemed to be less
noxious than the most nuisance-like use permitted in the zone. Thus,
4 See Regina Armstrong and Tina Lund, Up from the Ruins: Why Rezoning New York
City's Manufacturing Areas for Housing Makes Sense, 2 Rethinking Develop Rep *iii (Manhat-
tan Institute for Policy Research, June 2005), online at http://www.manhattan-
institute.org/pdf/rdr_02.pdf (visited Dec 20,2009).
5 272 US 365 (1926).
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commercial, multifamily, and single-family uses would all be permitted
in industrial zones, and landowners could freely convert industrial uses
into other uses within those zones as the market dictated.
After World War II, municipalities began experimenting with
noncumulative zones that excluded residential uses from industrial
zones. During the 1950s, state courts were typically skeptical of such
ordinances, regarding them as inconsistent with the antinuisance ra-
tionale for zoning that had been proffered in Village of Euclid as zon-
ing's primary justification.! Between 1953 and 1956, state courts re-
peatedly overturned such ordinances as either inconsistent with the
state constitution or the state zoning enabling act,' largely relying on
the theory that residential uses were "the highest use to which land
can be put" such that excluding them from industrial zones did not
serve to prevent any harm.' These opinions (unsurprisingly) over-
looked the insight later captured by Ronald Coase that all nuisances
are jointly caused by plaintiff and defendant,' although some of them
acknowledged in dicta that municipalities could protect industry from
the threat of nuisance suits by excluding residential uses from indu-
strially zoned districts." It was not until 1956 that the California Court
of Appeals upheld noncumulative zones. However, even the Roney v
Board of Supervisors of Contra Costa County" decision relied on the
idea that residential uses needed to be protected from industry and
not vice versa: the court found that exclusion of residential uses from
heavy industry zones in Contra Costa County prevented the "decline
6 Id at 388.
7 See, for example, Corthouts v Town of Newington, 99 A2d 112, 115 (Conn 1953) (holding
unconstitutional a zoning ordinance that fails to serve state welfare in banning housing in an
area not currently needed for industrial purposes); Comer v City of Dearborn, 70 NW2d 813,
816-17 (Mich 1955) (holding that building a motel in an industrial area could not be stopped
because the motel would not cause injury to the those near it and those around the motel would
likewise cause no injury to the motel or its occupants); Katobimar Realty Co v Webster, 118 A2d
824,831 (NJ 1955) (holding that an ordinance restricting a shopping center from being built in an
area zoned for light industry was arbitrary and thus invalid because retail commercial use and
light industry were not incongruous uses of land and the exclusion had no bearing on public
welfare); Depew v Township of Hillsborough, decided together with Kozesnik v Township of
Montgomery, 131 A2d 1, 12-13 (NJ 1957) (striking down a zoning ordinance that allowed for
quarrying but required the quarry to maintain a buffer zone only as to neighboring dwellings and
not as to unimproved neighboring parcels because such an ordinance is arbitrary and incon-
gruous in recognizing the potential nuisance the quarry represents but expressly denying protec-
tion to some neighboring properties). But see Roney v Board of Supervisors of Contra Costa
County, 292 P2d 529,532 (Cal App 1956) (upholding a noncumulative ordinance).
8 See, for example, Corthouts, 99 A2d at 114.
9 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 2 (1960).
10 See Depew, 131 A2d at 9.
11 292 P2d 529 (Cal App 1956).
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of new residential districts into blighted areas by their being sur-
rounded by heavy industry" and protected the housing supply general-
ly "by removing residences from fumes."2
This focus on protecting residences from industrial uses began to
change in New York City when Robert Wagner began a campaign to
revise New York's zoning resolution between 1947 and 1961. Unlike
the state court opinions that justified such exclusion largely in terms
of protecting residential uses from the fumes and noise of industry, the
studies commissioned by Wagner and his appointees argued that in-
dustrial uses were threatened by housing and that the city needed to
safeguard its industrial future by reserving land exclusively for the
former. As the Board of Estimate of the City of New York declared in
1960 when endorsing the Wagner-sponsored reports: "Placing industry
on the bottom of the zoning priority pyramid has created a situation
in which prime industrial land in the city has been wasted and pre-
empted by spotty and inappropriate residential and commercial de-
velopment."" After a decade of protracted political struggle," Wagner
got his wish when the city council enacted the 1961 Zoning Resolu-
tion5 that provided, for the first time, noncumulative manufacturing
zones in New York City."
What had changed by the early 1960s that would make more
compelling these calls to protect industry from residential uses? Be-
tween 1955 and 1965, New York's industry had been devastated by a
revolution in transportation that deprived cities of their comparative
advantage in attracting and retaining manufacturing. At the center of
12 Id at 532.
13 Journal of Proceedings, Board of Estimate of the City of New York, 15581,15582 (1960)
("1960 Proceedings").
14 The revision commenced when Robert Wagner was appointed chair of the Planning
Commission in 1947. Noncumulative zoning was the centerpiece of the revisions proposed by
Wagner's Commission in the 1950 study produced by Harrison, Ballard & Allen, the firm that
Wagner hired as a consultant. See generally Harrison, Ballard, & Allen, Plan for Rezoning the
City of New York: A Report to the New York City Planning Commission (Oct 1950). Although
Robert Moses's opposition insured that the Planning Commission did not act on the Harrison,
Ballard, & Allen study, see Robert Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New
York 792-94 (Knopf 1974), Wagner's election as mayor in 1953 insured that noncumulative
zoning would be placed back on the city's agenda. James Felt, Wagner's appointee as chair of the
Planning Commission, commissioned a second study that, like the Harrison, Ballard, & Allen
study, recommended the creation of exclusive manufacturing zones. See Voorhees, Walker, Smith,
& Smith, Zoning New York City: Proposal for a Zoning Resolution, Report to the New York City
Planning Commission 176-227 (Aug 12, 1958).
15 See New York City Department of City Planning, The Zoning Regulation of the City of
New York (Dec 15, 1961) online at
httpJ/www.nyc.gov/html/dep/pdf/zone/zoning-maps.and-resolution 1961.pdf (visited Nov 8,2009).
16 Id at 182.
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this revolution was the creation of an interstate highway system and the
"container revolution" integrating the shipment of goods in a single
metal box across rail, trucking, and shipping." Radically reducing ship-
ping costs, this transportation revolution eliminated most of the advan-
tage of locating factories in immediate proximity to Brooklyn's piers.
By 1965, New York City had lost much of its maritime shipping business
to New Jersey, and factories had deserted Bay Ridge and Sunset Park in
droves: New York's waterfront had been reduced to derelict shambles,
and the city's industrial job base had suffered staggering losses."
Responding to pressure from manufacturers and unions, New
York's and other big cities' politicians pressed for incentives to keep
manufacturing enterprises in the city." For the first time, urban plan-
ners and planning-oriented economists during the 1960s were urging
cities to adopt noncumulative zones not as a solution to nuisance-
blighted homes but rather as an aid to priced-out factories." New
York's 1961 move to noncumulative zoning has been matched by oth-
er large cities' efforts to attract or retain industry. The names and de-
tails of these zoning schemes differ (Chicago calls them "planned
manufacturing districts," San Francisco calls them "industrial protec-
tion zones," and Los Angeles, "industrial business zones"). The zoning
restrictions are sometimes accompanied by various forms of subsidies
such as bonding secured with tax-increment districts, use valuation for
property taxation, tax credits, and job training grants." But the essen-
tial feature of the zoning part of industrial retention is identical across
cities: cities reduce the burdens on urban industry by excluding com-
peting nonindustrial uses in industrial zones. It is now a fairly ordinary
theme of urban planners and big city politicians that cities should
17 In 1955, Robert Meyner, New Jersey's governor, announced that, in collaboration with the
New York Port Authority, New Jersey would sponsor the creation of a massive 450-acre container
port facility in Port Elizabeth. Rejecting the Port Authority's offer to take over the city's dock facili-
ties, New York City tried to fight back with improvements of its own port terminal facilities in Bay
Ridge, Sunset Park, and Red Hook, but to no avail: the city's snarled transportation network (in
which trucks would have to battle Holland and Lincoln TUnnel traffic) and lack of railheads pre-
vented any city-side piers from being competitive with New Jersey's It did not help that New Jersey
designed its facilities with container shipping in mind, while New York cleaved to the state-of-the-
art technology for break-bulk cargo. See Marc Levinson, The Box: How the Shipping Container
Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger 76-100 (Princeton 2006).
18 See id at 96-97.
19 See id at 191-96.
20 See, for example, William M. Shenkel, The Economic Consequences of Industrial Zoning,
40 Land Econ 255,264-65 (1964).
21 See, for example, New York City Industrial Development Agency, Industrial Incentive
Program (2009), online at http://www.nycedc.com/Financinglncentives/Financing/Industrial
IncentProg/Pages/IndustriallncentiveProgram.aspx (visited Nov 8,2009).
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create zones that will prevent manufacturing from being ousted by
"gentrifying" residential uses.
Two arguments dominate this defense of noncumulative industri-
al zoning. First, both planners and industrial users of urban land com-
plain that intruding residential uses threaten industrial uses with com-
plaints about noise, smell, or traffic. As Robert J. Hughes, the owner of
Erie Basin Bargeport, the city's largest barge operator, stated in ex-
plaining his opposition to luxury waterfront condos in Red Hook,
Brooklyn: "The first thing luxury condo owners will do is 'sue us."
As noted above, this justification has been prominent in judicial opi-
nions upholding noncumulative zones since 1956, and it remains the
exclusive justification offered by the New York City Planning De-
partment's website.
Second, manufacturers and unions worry that residential users
will bid up the price of land, causing landowners to hike rents on in-
dustrial users who will respond by fleeing to the suburbs." The trans-
portation revolution increased the elasticity of demand for industrial
land so much that cities can no longer hope to retain manufacturing
enterprises simply by offering proximity to customers or suppliers.
By excluding residential (and, less frequently, even office and com-
22 See, for example, Pratt Center for Community Development, Protecting New York's
Threatened Manufacturing Space (April 16, 2009), online at
http://prattcenter.net/sites/default/files/publications/Threatened%20Manufacturing.pdf (visited
Nov 8,2009); Laura Wolf-Powers, Up-Zoning New York City's Mixed-Use Neighborhoods: Prop-
erty-Led Economic Development and the Anatomy of a Planning Dilemma, 24 J Planning Educ
& Rsrch 379, 389-90 (2005); Adam Friedman, Zoning to Protect Manufacturing, Gotham Gazette
(Apr 2003), online at http://www.gothamgazette.comlarticle/landuse/20030422/12/358 (visited
Nov 8,2009).
2 Julia Vitullo-Martin, The Battle of Red Hook, NY Sun Arts & Letters 13 (Apr 13,2006).
24 The Planning Department's "overview" of manufacturing districts explains that "[t]he
1961 Zoning Resolution separated industrial and residential areas to insulate residential com-
munities from industrial traffic and other irritants, and to shield industry from nuisance-
generated complaints." NY City Department of City Planning, Overview of Manufacturing Dis-
tricts (New York City Zoning Reference 2009), online at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zhmanudistricts.shtm (visited Nov 8,2009). The website
is silent about reducing the cost of land for manufacturing by zoning out competition.
25 See Shenkel, 40 Land Econ at 263 (cited in note 20) (discussing the rising cost of land
for industry given residential or commercial uses of property in industrial areas); Nat Ives, Zone
Defense: Manufacturers Are Demanding an Eye for an Eye, a Factory for an Office Building, City
Limits Magazine (June 2001), online at
http://www.citylimits.org/content/articles/viewarticle.cfm?article-id=2054 (visited Nov 8, 2009)
(describing worries of a Long Island furniture factory operator that rezoning to residential will
cause rents to bump up in Long Island City and demanding down-zoning to manufacturing of
the surrounding area).
26 Edward L. Glaeser, Cities Agglomeration and Spatial Equilibrium 7 (Oxford 2008); Doug-
las Rae, City: Urbanism and Its End 361-63 (Yale 2003).
The University of Chicago Law Review
mercial uses), the central city can provide an in-kind subsidy of
cheaper land to manufacturers as a bribe to get them to locate or ex-
pand in the city.
Such exclusively industrial zoning has potentially large costs.
Land zoned for nonresidential uses could be an important source of
residential housing. In 2005, the City of New York zoned 22,500 acres
of land exclusively for manufacturing uses: developed at even a small
fraction of Brooklyn's average density of fifty-five dwelling units per
acre, this land could provide thousands of units of housing in a city
with a notorious shortage of residential units." Of course, there is no
way to easily calculate how much of this land would actually be used
for residential uses if zoning were cumulative, but there is anecdotal
evidence of high demand for industrially zoned land among residen-
tial users. In the 1930s, fully half of all New Yorkers lived in non-
residential zones," and, even under the post-1961 regime of noncu-
mulative zoning, manufacturing zones accommodate a large number
of residential units-so many, in fact, that the city's crackdown on il-
legal conversions of manufacturing units to residential use was im-
peded by the threat of leaving hundreds of tenants stranded."
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE TWO DOMINANT RATIONALES FOR
PROTECTING INDUSTRY WITH NONCUMULATIVE ZONING
It is not self-evident that keeping manufacturers within cities is a
good idea. If transportation and real estate costs are lower in less
densely populated areas, then the de-industrialization of cities might
27 Consider Armstrong and Lund, Up from the Ruins: Why Rezoning New York City's
Manufacturing Areas for Housing Makes Sense, 2 Rethinking Develop Rep at *iii (cited in
note 4).
28 Harrison, Ballard, & Allen, Plan for Rezoning at 4,90 (cited in note 14). Robert Wagner
commissioned the Harrison, Ballard, & Allen study in 1947, when he was chair of the planning
commission. See note 14.
29 These residential units consist of nonconforming uses, illegal occupants, and users who
managed to induce the city to legalize their occupancy through prolonged squatting. The oddest
subgroup of this last category are persons certified to be "artists" under the Multiple Dwelling
Law, see NY Mult Dwell Law §§ 275-76 (McKinney), who managed to legalize their illegal
occupancy of SoHo/NoHo lofts during the 1970s and now can maintain their occupancy only
after being certified by the Department of Cultural Affairs as genuine artists. See Nadine Bro-
zan, In a Changed SoHo, Legal Pentimento, NY Times sec 11 at 1 (June 8, 2003); New York City
Department of Cultural Affairs, Notice to Applicants Re: Artist Certification (2009), online at
http/www.nyc.gov/htnl/dclaldownloads/pdf/artist-certification.pdf (visited Nov 8, 2009). In 2005,
after the Bloomberg administration attempted to crack down on illegal conversions of buildings
zoned for manufacturing to residential uses, enforcement efforts left hundreds of tenants on the
street. See Matthew Sollars, Manufacturers Aren't Running Away: Steady Real Estate Prices Fewer
Conversions Keep Industry in the City, 25 Crain's NY Bus 17 (May 18,2009).
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be a boon rather than a bane. In what follows, we adopt what Timothy
Bartik has called the "market failure" perspective on the problem of
urban industrial uses: we try to define the circumstances under which
markets in land might fail to reflect the socially optimal amount of
industry in urban areas.
There is a theoretically plausible story to tell in which cities sub-
sidizing industrial retention or relocation would be a sensible strategy,
both from the city's and the larger social perspective. This story, how-
ever, depends on the ability of a city to identify specific industrial and
commercial uses that will create increasing returns. We argue that
noncumulative zoning is likely to be too inflexible and indiscriminate
to identify these uses, and we suggest that a "regulatory compliance"
defense and tax or grant subsidies would be better mechanisms for
industrial retention if, in fact, such retention is advisable. Further, we
argue that the political costs of noncumulative zoning are particularly
harmful. Because it is in-kind and not cash, the subsidy provided by
noncumulative zoning does not have to compete in the annual budget-
ing process with other possible uses of public money like schools,
roads, or general tax cuts, and, therefore, there is no political or inter-
est group competition to determine whether industrial retention is the
best way for the city to spend scarce public resources.
A. Using Noncumulative Zones to Stop Nuisance Complaints: Why
Not Just Use a "Regulatory Compliance" Defense?
The least controversial "market failure" for which exclusive in-
dustrial zones might be a plausible remedy is the problem of nuisance.
On this view, residential users will inefficiently drive out industrial
neighbors by complaining about nuisance costs such as noise, fumes, or
traffic. If an industrial landowner could somehow purchase, lease, or
buy easements for all of the land within ear- or noise-shot of their in-
dustrial facility, they could protect themselves from nuisance lawsuits
(or analogous administrative complaints). But transaction costs predict-
ably foil the effort to buy out a multitude of ill-identified potential
plaintiffs in a densely populated urban area. Excluding residential uses,
therefore, seems to recognize the basic Coasean point that all nuisances
are jointly caused by the active user and the quiet enjoyer. The conflict
can be solved just as easily by requiring the latter to keep out as by re-
quiring the former to stop making noise, fumes, dust, or traffic.
30 See Timothy Bartik, The Market Failure Approach to Regional Economic Development
Policy, 4 Econ Dev Q 361,361-62 (1990).
2010]1 257
The University of Chicago Law Review
The obvious difficulty with this "nuisance" rationale for noncu-
mulative zones, however, is suggested by the analogy to the "coming
to the nuisance" defense in tort law that serves the same nuisance-
suppressing function." However, there is a crucial difference: unlike
the noncumulative zone, the common law defense does not exclude
residential uses, but simply gives their neighbors a defense against
lawsuits. Why not, then, allow residential users to occupy land in man-
ufacturing zones, but give industrial users a defense of regulatory
compliance against any nuisance or analogous lawsuits that might
otherwise be applicable? If residential users prefer the grit and noise
of industrial neighbors to residential alternatives, then excluding them
from manufacturing zones entirely would seem to impose an unneces-
sary deadweight cost on persons deprived of what might be their best
available housing opportunities.
There is plenty of precedent for such a regulatory compliance de-
fense to protect active users from quiet enjoyers. In particular, many
states have passed "right-to-farm" laws that give existing farms a right
to continue defined farming activities against nuisance complaints
about the obnoxious side effects.32 Why not create right-to-stink laws
that serve an analogous function for industry? Or why not let owners
of land in noncumulatively zoned areas build residential housing in
return for agreeing not to file nuisance suits?
One difficulty with right-to-farm legislation is that such statutes typ-
ically protect only existing uses from nuisance complaints. It is a com-
mon complaint of industrial users that the presence of residences pre-
vents their expansion as well as continuation. To the extent that one
wanted to protect prospective industrial uses from existing residential
users' complaints, then one would need a full defense of regulatory com-
pliance, under which current or future uses consistent with the manufac-
turing zone's use schedule would be exempt from liability even if they
arose after the plaintiff or complainant purchased within the zone.
31 See Donald Wittman, First Come, First Served: An Economic Analysis of "Coming to the
Nuisance," 9 J Legal Stud 557, 557-58 (1980). Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the fact
that an owner of a neighboring tract of land purchased the land after the uses that constitute the
nuisance began is not an absolute defense to a tort action, but rather "is a factor to be considered in
determining whether the nuisance is actionable." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 840D (1977).
32 See Terence C. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When Do Right-to-
Farm Laws Go Too Far?, 33 BC Envir Affairs L Rev 87,95-101 (2006).
33 See Swedenberg v Phillips, 562 So 2d 170, 172-73 (Ala 1990) (concluding the right-to-
farm law did not apply because plaintiffs resided on their property prior to construction of the
defendant's chicken house).
3 There is an interesting question of whether the prospect of elimination of nuisance
liability for future noxious uses would constitute a taking of the residential user's property. See,
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Such a strong defense of regulatory compliance, in which a lot
that is vacant or residential could be converted into a smoke-spewing
smelter, places a heavy burden on potential residential users to re-
search and insure against changes in the use of nearby land, either
through on-site precautions (for example, triple-pane windows) or
simply taking a short-term lease rather than a fee simple interest.
Manufacturing zones that form the basis for a regulatory compliance
defense, therefore, might need more detailed specifications of permiss-
ible uses, including emissions and decibel levels to serve as notification
for housing consumers.
Of course, a state-law defense of regulatory compliance would
not eliminate federally protected rights to be free from proximate
noxious uses. But the same considerations that counsel in favor of a
state-law defense also suggest that there ought to be limits to federal
liability. One could, for instance, imagine a Title VI lawsuit by minority
residents of a cumulatively zoned industrial district complaining about
the concentration of industrial uses in their neighborhood." If the land
were zoned for manufacturing when those residents purchased or
rented their units, however, then barring the lawsuit with a regulatory
compliance defense might be the most sensible result to preserve a
variety of residential opportunities at reasonable cost. After all, urban
industry is more beneficial to low-income households if it is closely
integrated with existing housing and retail. (Fenced-off and isolated
industrial parks like the Bathgate Industrial Park in the South Bronx
are less likely to employ local residents, which is one of the primary
rationales for inducing industry to invest in the city in the first place.")
The price of such investment is that the noise and smells of factories
ought not to be the basis for barring residential uses absent a health
risk that consumers would ordinarily be barred from assuming.
for example, Gacke v Pork Xtra, 684 NW2d 168, 173-74 (Iowa 2004) (determining that the court
was not incorrect in applying a per se takings analysis to the nuisance question); Bormann v
Board of Supervisors, 584 NW2d 309, 321 (Iowa 1998). If the municipality could zone land non-
cumulatively for industry and exclude residential uses altogether, however, then it is difficult to
see why the municipality could not take the lesser step of permitting residential uses only on the
waiver of their rights to seek recovery for nuisance.
35 See National Academy of Public Administration, Addressing Community Concerns:
How Environmental Justice Relates to Land Use Planning and Zoning 178-79 (July 2003) (noting
that the City of Chicago's commitment to "economic development in Southeast Chicago" could
exacerbate "the health and environmental threats that area residents already face").
3 See Robert Lane, The Machine Next Door, 10 Places 10, 17-19 (1995) (noting that large
buffers, parking spaces, and other density-reducing measures that protect nearby housing
projects from noise also isolate them from the industrial park).
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Whether considered as a defense to state-law nuisance lawsuits or
federal statutory claims, the proposed "right-to-stink" defense might fall
outside of the legislative power of many municipalities. In general, ci-
ties do not have the right to create defenses to state tort laws." The state
judiciary, however, could construe the common law of nuisance to in-
clude a strong regulatory compliance defense, and federal courts could
construe the vague terms of Title VI to encompass such a defense. 8
Even if such a defense requires authorization through amendment of
the state zoning enabling act, however, this necessity is only an argu-
ment that a city should condition elimination of noncumulative zoning
on the passage of such state authorization. Further, it is possible such a
defense could be accomplished through contract or negotiations over
exempting specific land uses from the strictures of a noncumulative
zoning regime.
B. Reducing the Price of Urban Land for Manufacturing: Why Non-
cumulative Zones Are Too Indiscriminate, Inflexible, and Invisible
to Be a Rational Subsidy for Industry
The major justification for exclusion of residential uses from
manufacturing zones is less concerned with prevention of nuisance
litigation than with stabilization of land prices. In purpose and effect,
noncumulative zoning is a subsidy to draw manufacturing enterprises
to the city-it reduces the cost of manufacturing land in the city, and,
thereby, is a subsidy to new manufacturing entrants.
Does it ever make sense to influence the location of industry with
such subsidies? Referencing some literature on urban economics and
agglomeration economies, we argue that such subsidies theoretically
can make sense in certain circumstances, both from the city's point of
view and social welfare more generally. However, noncumulative zon-
ing does not seem well suited for delivering such subsidies when com-
37 Richard Briffault and Laurie Reynolds, State and Local Government Law 309-10 (West
6th ed 2001).
38 Consider Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VI"), Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat
253, codified at 42 USC § 2000(e) et seq ("No person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.");
Regents of the University of California v Bakke, 438 US 265,328 (1978) (construing racial discrimi-
nation under Title VI to include only those racial classifications that would be proscribed under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Hodges v Public Building Commission of
Chicago, 873 F Supp 128, 132 (ND Il 1995) (holding that a city is not a "program or activity" for
purposes of Title VI, such that the action against the city's department of planning and develop-
ment, which allegedly engaged in discrimination in violation of Title VI, must fail).
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pared to outright grants or tax subsidies. In particular, noncumulative
zones are so indiscriminate, inflexible, and politically invisible that the
deadweight costs imposed on residential users are likely to outweigh
the benefits to the city's economy.
1. Does it ever make sense to subsidize industry's retention in
urban areas?
a) The Tiebout-based argument against subsidies. The basic ar-
gument against urban subsidies relies on a relatively simple collective
action story. George Zodrow and Peter Mieszkowski, among others,
have argued that tax competition for mobile firms leads to an ineffi-
ciently low level of local taxes and services." When setting tax rates,
localities will take into account that an increase in taxes will drive
away firms. As this will be the case for all cities-the models explicitly
assume that all cities are the same-taxes will be set at a lower level
than is socially optimal." Tax incentives for specific firms exacerbate
the problems of tax competition, as they are a particularly pernicious
version of the generalized story. If mobile capital generally can take
advantage of the collective action problems facing cities to earn rents,
the ability of individually mobile firms to demand subsidies is like giv-
ing mobile capital as a class the ability to price discriminate.
Arguments based on the well-known Tiebout model come to a
similar conclusion from very different priors. In the Tiebout model,
tax competition is generally good-firms and individuals sort to those
local governments in which the cost of taxation equals the benefits of
services to them.42 However, in the model, tax breaks or subsidies to
individual firms could not occur, as any effort to tax Peter to hand out
to pay Paul will result in Peter skipping town. If there is sufficient in-
efficiency in the market for location (say, transaction costs), individua-
39 George R. Zodrow and Peter Mieszkowski, Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the
Underprovision of Local Public Goods, 19 J Urban Econ 356,368-69 (1986).
4 See Wallace E. Oates and Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition among Jurisdic-
tions; Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J Public Econ 333, 335 (1988); Zodrow
and Mieskowski, 19 J Urban Econ at 359 (cited in note 39).
41 See generally Oates and Schwab, 35 J Public Econ 333 (cited in note 40). The big differ-
ence between these models is how they understand the way capital is taxed. In the Zodrow-
Mieskowski model, there are two types of taxes-general head taxes on all individuals and a tax
rate on capital. In the Oates-Schwab model, all property taxes-including taxes on capital-are
treated as if they were head taxes. This implicitly relies on an assumption that zoning can be used
to tie the level of capital to the level of public services. Compare Zodrow and Mieskowski, 19 J
Urban Econ at 357 n 1 (cited in note 39) with Oates and Schwab, 35 J Public Econ at 342-43
(cited in note 40).
42 See Charles M.Tiebout,A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J Polit Econ 416,417 (1956).
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lized subsidies will result in a loss for all taxed firms and movement
away from the efficient allocation of taxes and services.
In both of these literatures, subsidies to mobile firms will always be
socially bad, and because they assume that all cities are identical, they
will be bad for each city. However, if cities differ and firms provide city-
specific externalities, there can be an economic case for local subsidies.
b) The agglomeration-based argument for subsidies. The Tiebout
model literature works from two assumptions that effectively forec-
lose the arguments in favor of industrial subsidies. First, the model
assumes that individuals and firms are merely consumers of local ser-
vices, and, second, it assumes that all cities are the same." Any eco-
nomic case for subsidies must be built around entirely opposite as-
sumptions-that is, that firms are not necessarily only consumers of
services, but instead can produce positive externalities and that cities
are different from one another in the degree to which they can cap-
ture these externalities.
In their efforts to explain why cities develop, economists have de-
veloped a voluminous literature usually called "agglomeration eco-
nomics" or the "New Economic Geography."" This literature argues
that individuals and firms locate near others because of the external
benefits of physical proximity. Specifically, they have identified three
major reasons why firms and individuals cluster in cities: (1) to reduce
shipping costs for goods; (2) to access deep markets (particularly labor
markets, but also consumption and social markets), which provide
more specialized services and employers, insurance against firm- or
industry-specific risk, and quick matching; and (3) for information
spillovers between firms and individuals, either inside an industry or
between industries, that promote both increased production and the
development of human capital over time." Some of these forces are
regional, like labor markets in which people can commute from any-
43 See id at 423.
44 For the clearest summaries of this work by the leading figures in the field, see Glaeser,
Cities; Agglomeration and Spatial Equilibrium at 1-11 (cited in note 26) (describing urban econom-
ics and agglomeration economies, which exist whenever people become more productive because
of proximity to others); Masahisa Fujita, Paul Krugman, and Anthony J. Venables, The Spatial
Economy: Cities Regions, and International Trade 1-6 (MIT Press 1999); Edward L. Glaeser, Are
Cities Dying?, 12 J Econ Persp 139, 157 (1998). For a more complete treatment of the relationship
among agglomeration economics, the Tiebout model, and local government law, see David
Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U Ill L Rev *2-48 (forthcoming), online
at httpJ//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmn?abstractid=1471555 (visited Nov 8, 2009).
45 See Glaeser, Spatial Equilibrium at 6-8 (cited in note 44).
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where in a region. Others, however, are highly local, like information
spillovers that depend on personal interactions among land users.
Merely permitting the market for property to work might lead to
too little clustering of firms in cities because individual firms will fail
to take into account the positive effect they have on other firms and
individuals. Giving cities the ability to engage in non-firm specific tax
and policy competition can also result in less clustering of firms to the
extent that cities have incentives to engage in restrictive zoning for the
sole purpose of reducing the average costs of providing local public
goods, because people and firms may move away from the best loca-
tion from the point of view of agglomeration economies in order to
obtain their desired set of city services. (For example, if New York
brokers move to several different suburbs to get different packages of
public services, then they might be less productive because they will
have fewer chances to interact with other financial wizards and there-
by reap agglomeration economies in information.") The core case for
industrial subsidies follows ordinary Pigouivian principles for subsidiz-
ing beneficial spillovers: cities that derive special spillover benefits
from particular firms or industries should subsidize those firms or in-
dustries until private costs are reduced to the point where they make
the socially optimal decision.7
But this general insight hides a knotty empirical problem: deter-
mining whether a firm's decision to locate in the city will present a
sufficient positive externality to justify a subsidy requires a determina-
tion that the size of the externality will be higher than the various
deadweight costs imposed by taxation. Taxation at the local govern-
mental level produces two distinct sorts of deadweight losses. Aside
from the ordinary excess burden caused by taxation's distorting effect
on consumption or production, local taxes also influence residential
choices. Unless the tax is effectively a benefits charge paid exclusively
by those who receive the external benefit of the subsidy, increases in
46 See Schleicher, 2010 U Ill L Rev at *6 (cited in note 44).
47 See Teresa Garcia-Mild and Therese J. McGuire, Tax Incentives and the City 95, 103-04
(Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs, 2002). Teresa Garcia-Mild and Therese McGuire
have shown that, as a theoretical matter, local subsidies or tax breaks can be wealth creating
(both for the city and for society) if the tax breaks are designed to lure firms that generate ex-
ternalities that can be captured by the city's economy to a greater degree than they can be cap-
tured in other locations. Id at 114. By virtue of an example, Garcia-Mild and McGuire note that
city subsidies do not seem to accomplish this even if it is theoretically possible. Id (identifying as
an example Chicago's attempt to bring Boeing headquarters to the city through tax breaks and
other incentives while simultaneously declining to attempt to retain a Brach's manufacturing
plant in the city).
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taxation may (on the margin) cause some residents to exit to other loca-
tions." And individual residents can create agglomeration spillovers just
as readily as industry-city residents participate in local labor markets,
provide intellectual spillovers, and so on. If artists, actors, financial wi-
zards, writers, or other creative types are driven out of the city because
of high tax burdens, then the agglomeration economies that they gener-
ate by hanging out at caf6s and exchanging ideas will be lost.
Thus, for a subsidy to be justified for a given city, the external
benefits provided by the subsidized firm must be greater than (a) the
sum of the cost to existing residents of local taxation (in, say, changing
their consumption patterns or labor market participation in inefficient
ways) and (b) the loss of external benefits generated by those who are
priced out of the city by taxation. This formula implies that industrial
subsidies are justified from the city's perspective only if the industrial
tenant thus gained or retained will be a far better generator of benefi-
cial spillovers than whomever they displace.
Such a formula suggests that the mechanism for providing indus-
trial subsidies should not be indiscriminate or inflexible. Policies that
provide subsidies to crudely defined categories of industry are unlike-
ly to distinguish between industries that generate net benefits after
the cost of the subsidies is taken into account. Take, for example, intel-
lectual spillovers, which are commonly cited as the most prominent
agglomeration benefit of dense industrial concentration." Cities are
said to foster a "creative class" precisely because their density allows
persons who benefit from intellectual spillovers to interact frequently
and informally." It is, however, difficult to determine which mix of
firms-whether diverse or homogenous-or which type of firms gene-
rates intellectual spillovers." But there is little doubt that subsidizing
industry in general, rather than industries with particular characteris-
tics (such as investments of high levels of human capital, which is tied
to the degree of spillovers, or known high degrees of intellectual fer-
48 Agglomeration economies limit the degree to which taxes generate exit, but do not eliminate
it. See Schleicher, 2010 U M L Rev at *37-51 (cited in note 44); Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribu-
tion, Living Wage Ordinances and Judicial Intervention, 101 Nw U L Rev 1057,1081-85 (2007).
49 See Glaeser, 12 J Econ Persp at 147-48 (cited in note 44).
50 See Edward L. Glaeser and David C. Mar6, Cities and Skills, 19 J Labor Econ 316, 340
(2001); Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It's Transforming Work, Lei-
sure, Community and Everyday Life 214-22 (Basic Books 2002) (arguing that the economy clus-
ters where creative people cluster to take advantage of creative capital).
51 Compare Edward L. Glaeser, et al, Growth in Cities, 100 J Polit Econ 1126, 1150-51
(1992) (noting competing theories of spillovers and determining that diversity-based theories
perform better) with Vernon Henderson, Marshall's Scale Economies, 53 J Urban Econ 1, 21-23
(2003) (noting that industry clusters produce more spillovers).
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ment") is a waste of money. Obvious examples of industries in which
the workers benefit from interaction might be the movie, software,
publishing, and education industries. Or perhaps subsidies should be
given to small businesses, which Jane Jacobs suggested generate more
new innovations than large lumbering firms.53 There are manufacturing
jobs that also require high human capital investments with high de-
grees of spillover, and small manufacturers as well. No one, however,
has made the case that manufacturing in general automatically gene-
rates spillover benefits in excess of the costs of subsidies necessary to
keep such jobs in the city.
The same argument can be made for increasing the labor market
size. There are spillover benefits from labor market depth, but manu-
facturing industries do not indiscriminately generate such benefits.
Deep labor markets provide gains from specialization and insurance.
Deep labor markets also provide labor with insurance against firm- or
industry-specific risk. If a single firm or field in a big city does badly,
an individual who works there can get another job without relocat-
ing." Further, deep labor markets have lower search costs for both
firms and individuals, as it is easier to find the proper labor (or firm) if
there are many choices. This has dynamic effects as well. Increased
localization creates incentives for labor to invest in human capital, as
they can be sure these investments will not be wasted.
52 See generally Edward L. Glaeser and Albert Saiz, The Rise of the Skilled City 47 (Brook-
ings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs, 2004).
53 See Jane Jacobs, The Economy of Cities 86-99 (Random House 1969) (arguing that cities
with lots of small firms were more innovative than industrial centers).
54 See Robert Lucas, On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J Monetary Econ 3,
40 (1988):
New York City's garment district, financial district, diamond district, advertising district and
many more are as much intellectual centers as is Columbia or New York University. The
specific ideas exchanged in these centers differ, of course, from those exchanged in academ-
ic circles, but the process is much the same.... A collection of people doing pretty much the
same thing, each emphasizing his own originality and uniqueness.
Consider the fashion industry. New York City is considering removing zoning restrictions in the
garment district in favor of direct subsidies to garment producers (by designating specific build-
ing which are devoted exclusively to garment production) on the grounds that they provide
spillovers to the garment design industry. Charles V. Bagli, New York Seeks to Shore up Factories
in Its Shrinking Garment District, NY Times A20 (Aug 20,2009). While we have not explored the
economics of this case specifically, this is at the very least theorized in a far smarter way than
ordinary noncumulative zoning subsidy proposals.
55 See Glaeser, 12 J Econ Persp at 146 (cited in note 44).
56 For a model explaining urban agglomeration as a function of the interaction between
search costs and investments in human and physical capital, see Daron Acemoglu, A Microfoundation
for Social Increasing Returns in Human CapitalAccumulation, 111 Q J Econ 779,780-81 (1996).
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To the extent labor is not fungible across industries, labor market
depth might provide an argument for subsidizing industries that are
already large in any given urban area. By having more firms in these
industries, there will be more labor demanded, more specialization,
and greater insurance against firm-specific risk (although less against
industry-specific risk). But this argument does not support indiscrimi-
nate manufacturing subsidies in most cities because manufacturing
has substantially left most urban areas. Instead, the argument for la-
bor-market depth provides an argument for subsidizing certain classes
of industry in which cities are already strong, thereby retaining labor
market depth and preserving the market's quality and specialization.
Cities certainly engage in this type of subsidy policy. For instance, New
York City granted Broadway theater companies a subsidy by allowing
them to sell the air rights above their theaters to developers." Spray-
ing dollars indiscriminately at the manufacturing sector, however,
seems intuitively an implausible way to preserve labor market depth.
One might as well deepen the labor market by simply attracting all
sorts of businesses through generally lower taxes.
Finally, the traditional arguments for concentrating industry in
urban areas-reduction in transportation costs-seems increasingly
implausible as a justification for manufacturing subsidies. If there are
some increasing returns to firm size and real transportation costs,
manufacturing firms may locate in the same city to avoid paying for
intercity shipping.59 However, the importance of this as a force for ag-
glomeration has fallen, as intercity transport costs have fallen dramat-
ically in the last fifty years.6 It barely costs anything to ship, say, lug
nuts, and so the value to other firms of having locally sourced lug nuts
is now very low. As a result, it is hard to imagine a justification for ur-
ban industrial subsidies on the basis of reducing transport costs. The
57 This assumes there will be increasing returns to market size. The extent of these increas-
ing returns might taper off at some point-going from a few generalists to a number of special-
ists may provide large benefits, but going from a field with many specialized workers to a field
with many superspecialized workers may not provide the same size of gains. Or it might provide
bigger gains. Of course, this is a difficult to impossible thing to determine, but doing so is the only
way to make labor-market-depth targeted subsidies work.
58 See Patrick McGeehan, Theaters See a Lifeline above as Developers Pursue Midtown
Opportunities, NY Times A23 (July 6,2008).
59 See Schleicher, 2010 U Ill L Rev at *14-19 (cited in note 44).
6o See Glaeser, Spatial Equilibrium at 7-8 (cited in note 44); Edward L. Glaeser and Gia-
como A.M. Ponzetto, Did the Death of Distance Hurt Detroit and Help New York? *5-7 (Nation-
al Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 13710, Dec 2007), online at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl3710 (visited Nov 8, 2009) (reporting that the cost of moving one
ton of goods one mile by rail has decreased by 90 percent over the last 120 years).
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same can be said for increasing the depth of consumption markets:
while there is value in having a varied set of consumption opportuni-
ties in urban areas, it is unlikely that subsidies for manufacturing will
greatly improve the depth of consumption markets. Given the reduc-
tion in shipping costs, it is hard to see the value of subsidizing a wide
variety of locally produced manufactured goods. People move to New
York, for instance, because there are real benefits from being able to
choose among a bunch of highly specialized restaurants or bars on a
single street. Few are attracted by the prospect of a broad array of
choices for locally sourced lug nuts when they can just have them
shipped from elsewhere for little cost.
2. Comparing noncumulative zones to budget outlays and tax
subsidies as methods for subsidizing industrial retention.
Judged by the standards set forth above, noncumulative zoning is
a poor way of subsidizing retention of industry in urban areas. Such in-
kind land subsidies tend to be too (a) indiscriminate, (b) inflexible,
and (c) invisible to be reliably worth the deadweight costs that they
are likely to impose.
a) Noncumulative zoning as an indiscriminate subsidy. The most
obvious flaw with noncumulative zones is that they provide an indi-
scriminate subsidy to every business falling within the zoning district's
schedule of uses. These uses tend to be broadly defined, often includ-
ing (to the consternation of lobbyists for industrial land) not only in-
dustry but also commercial retailing. Even if retailers were excluded,
however, manufacturing districts do not make fine distinctions be-
tween manufacturing uses based on the quantity and quality of the
jobs that they produce. New York City, for instance, has only three
manufacturing use districts (light, medium, and heavy) defined by the
intensity of noise or pollution produced by the permitted uses.62 Al-
though these three categories are subdivided into use groups that va-
riously permit specific commercial uses, the resolution-like other
cities' zoning ordinances-provides no way to distinguish (for in-
stance) between a high-wage manufacturer using a highly skilled
workforce and a low-wage manufacturer employing very few workers
or unskilled nonresidents who commute from the suburbs. This focus
61 See, for example, Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economies: An Introductory Volume
(Macmillan 8th ed 1940) (noting that people care more about market size factors like specializa-
tion and insurance when purchasing high-end items than when purchasing staples).
62 NYC Zoning Res Art IV, § 41-11-13 (defining light, medium, and high manufacturing
districts within New York City).
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on nuisance costs is a legacy of the traditional nuisance-abating func-
tion of zoning, but it ensures that zoning categories are far too crude
to discriminate between businesses worth subsidizing and businesses
that produce no net gain for local residents. The result is that manufac-
turing districts contain those underused warehouses, parking lots, and
even abandoned buildings on New York's waterfront. Even when
such zones produce economically viable uses, there is no guarantee
that they will produce the high-wage jobs that their boosters urge as
their justification. One study of Chicago's planned manufacturing dis-
tricts found that planned manufacturing districts did not do much to
preserve high-paying manufacturing jobs even when they were occu-
pied by successful commercial businesses.63
The indiscriminate nature of manufacturing zones could be
solved by narrowing the number of permissible uses. This, indeed, is
the solution urged by New York's Industrial Retention Network,
which has urged the creation of industrial zones from which profitable
retail uses are excluded." There are legal obstacles to this. Conven-
tional legal doctrine bars municipalities from regulating land use
based on the nature of the user rather than the activity pursued on the
parcel, which might limit the ability of these zones to target particular
types of firms, like those that pay high wages.
63 See generally Joel Rast, Curbing Industrial Decline or Thwarting Redevelopment? An
Evaluation of Chicago's Clybourn Corridor, Goose Island, and Elston Corridor Planned Manufac-
turing Districts (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Center for Economic Development, 2005),
online at http://www4.uwm.edulced/publications/pmdstudyl.pdf (visited Nov 8, 2009) (finding that
"PMDs continue to provide jobs, but the majority of them are no longer manufacturing jobs").
64 See New York Industrial Retention Network, Industrial Employment Districts (2009), online
at http://www.nyim.orglindex.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewpage&pageid=756 (visited Nov 8,2009).
65 See Ohio Valley Orthopedics and Sports Medicine, Inc v Board of Trustees of Sycamore
Township, 816 NE2d 1088, 1091 (Ohio App 2004) ("Township zoning laws regulate the types of
uses to which structures and property may be put, not the identity of the user.") (quotation
marks and citations omitted); Maplewood Village Tenants Association v Maplewood Village, 116
NJ Super 372, 431 (Ct Ch Div 1971) (holding that zoning laws are not implicated when an
apartment building owner converts the apartment units into condominiums and sells them to
individual owners because the form of ownership and not the use of the land is being affected);
DeSena v Guide, 24 AD2d 165, 171 (NY 1965) (overturning a zoning regulation passed in re-
sponse to community picketing and protesting because zoning laws must focus exclusively on
land use and its direct effect on public health and safety); Metzdorf v Borough of Rumson, 170
A2d 249, 253 (NJ Super App Div 1961) (holding in the case of a testator who divided up his
waterfront property in such a manner that the resulting lots had inadequate water frontage
under a local zoning ordinance that the zoning law would not invalidate the devises because the
zoning power may reach only the manner in which land is utilized and not its alienability); VIa-
hos Realty Company, Inc v Little Boar's Head District, 146 A2d 257, 260 (NH 1958) (striking
down a zoning law that allowed for a nontransferable permit to a specific person to operate an
ice cream stand in a residential area because the nontransferable nature of the instrument con-
stituted regulating the type of user and not the use of the land itself); Abbadessa v The Board of
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Putting aside doctrinal obstacles, however, there is not any reason
to believe that manufacturing, rather than commercial or retail uses, is
the right category to use to maximize spillovers. Further, it is unlikely
that the city could have the confidence to select specific types of en-
terprises likely to produce, say, human capital spillovers at the risk of
leaving a lot vacant for an extended period of time, as unlike cash sub-
sidies, land subsidies require firms that not only want to locate in a
city, but want to locate in a specific location.
b) Noncumulative zones as an inflexible subsidy. If landowners
could easily obtain map amendments or use variances whenever the
existing manufacturing use was, in the judgment of the city, less valua-
ble than a proposed residential use, then the indiscriminate character
of zoning districts would not inflict any deadweight cost on housing
consumers. Landowners with manufacturing tenants that produced
few spillover benefits would simply seek to have their parcel rezoned
for residential uses, citing the low-value nature of its current use.
But land use changes, whether administrative or legislative, are
costly to obtain. Unlike outright grants of revenue that are regularly
reviewed through the budget process, zoning districts remain in place
until the planning commission, city council, or private parties propose
an amendment or variance. Landowners seeking to change zoning
designations face opposition from neighbors who typically oppose any
rezoning that increases density or bulk of the existing use. Residential
pioneers occupying artists' lofts, nonconforming uses, or specially
permitted conversions may also oppose rezoning that does not involve
structural alteration out of fear of the escalating real estate values that
such rezoning can bring. Opponents of rezoning may also include the
tenants of the landowner and their employees as well as rival devel-
opers looking to acquire underzoned property cheaply.6 The adminis-
trative and legislative process by which a map amendment is obtained
67
can be notoriously expensive and protracted.
Zoning Appeals of the City of New Haven, 54 A2d 675, 677 (Conn 1947) ("Zoning is concerned
with the use of specific existing buildings and lots, and not primarily with their ownership.").
66 As an illustrative example consider New York Water Taxi's opposition to rezoning the
Brooklyn waterfront from Manufacturing to Mixed-Use Residential. The New York Water Taxi
is owned by Douglas Durst, a legendary land assembler in New York City. See David Samuels,
The Real-Estate Royals: End of the Line?, NY Times sec 6 at 37 (Aug 10, 1997). As the owner of
the land recalls, "I called Douglas up, and said that it made no sense that his company, New York
Water Taxi, was fighting the project. But I never got a straight answer, just the party line: We
think your buildings should be industrial. But since when is Douglas Durst interested in preserv-
ing industrial jobs in Brooklyn?" Vitullo-Martin, Red Hook, NY Times at 13 (cited in note 23).
67 See Lawrence A. McDermott, The Rezoning Process, in Sidney 0. Dewberry, ed, Land De-
velopment Handbook, Planning, Engineering, and Surveying 157,158 (McGraw-Hill 3d ed 2008).
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This is not to say that well-connected and experienced developers
cannot pay the freight to alter the zoning where the gap between the
value of the existing use and the proposed residential use is extraordi-
narily high. By greasing the skids with community benefit agreements
or providing parks and playgrounds, developers can buy allies in the
city council.6' But landowners of individual buildings without exten-
sive development experience and connections may not be willing to
survive the objections of the neighbors.
The inflexibility of noncumulative zoning comes with an added
cost. Because the only way to use noncumulative zoning as a subsidy is
by procuring land, it generates inefficient substitution among manu-
facturers toward the use of more land rather than, say, more efficient
machines." Not only does this provide less benefit to manufacturers
than would a direct subsidy, it increases the cost to the city economy.
The cost of the noncumulative zoning "tax" will be borne by other
potential users of the property-that is, commercial users and resi-
dents. To the extent that the supply of housing and office space is li-
mited, any extra space is likely to draw in residents. If these residents
generate external returns of their own, then the costs of noncumula-
tive zoning are magnified.
c) The invisibility of noncumulative zoning's subsidy. In their in-
flexibility, zoning districts do not differ from tax subsidies that can
long outlive their utility." The in-kind subsidy of cheaper land pro-
68 The practice of inducing a rezoning through dealmaking is common practice in New
York. For a recent example-conveniently located along Rick Hills's running route-consider
the ongoing effort by the Walentas family to secure a residential rezoning of land on Dock Street
in DUMBO over neighbors' vocal opposition, greased by side payments of schools and afforda-
ble housing to city councilors. See PlanNYC, DUMBO Development (New York University
Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, Oct 19, 2009), online at
http://www.plannyc.org/taxonomy/term/675 (visited Nov 8, 2009) (describing the Walentas fami-
ly's proposed rezoning plan that envisions a building in which 70 of the 390 residential units are
classified as affordable housing); Eliot Brown, The Developers Who Came in from the Cold, New
York Observer (May 26, 2009), online at http://www.observer.com/2009/real-estate/developers-
who-came-cold (visited Nov 8,2009).
69 It should be noted that noncumulative zoning is not justified by problems with parcel
accumulation. Although manufacturing plants require large lots, a cumulatively zoned area could
require the same sized lots as a noncumulatively zoned one. Even if it did not, there are other,
more efficient ways of ensuring the ability of large lot development. See, for example, Michael
Heller and Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 Harv L Rev 1465,1488-1511 (2008).
70 As an example of such a tax subsidy, consider New York City's 421-a program providing
tax abatements for developers of residential real estate. See NYC Real Prop Tax § 421-a. Created
in the 1970s amidst widespread fears that the middle class was fleeing the city, the program con-
tinues today, providing tax subsidies for luxury housing that likely would be built without this
incentive and inspiring criticism that the program needlessly deprived the city of tax revenue.
See Preston Niblack and Molly Wasow Park, Worth the Cost? Evaluating the 421-a Property Tax
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vided by noncumulative zones is, however, inferior even to tax subsi-
dies in one respect: noncumulative zones seem much less visible even to
an attentive public. The reason for this invisibility is that the baseline of
"neutral" treatment is much harder to perceive in zoning than in taxa-
tion. When a manufacturer or developer receives tax abatement, then it
is obvious to minimally informed observers that they are receiving an
unusual benefit for which they should be held accountable, because the
layperson's baseline of expectations is that one normally pays taxes.
Thus, the New York City 421-a tax abatement program, which provides
tax relief to developers and owners of newly built condominium apart-
ments that have certain characteristics, generated enormous controver-
sy in the popular press, because of the perception that people like Cal-
vin Klein and Derek Jeter ought not to receive "special" tax relief7" By
contrast, when a manufacturer gets a cheap lot because competing bid-
ders have been zoned out of existence, there is no intuitive baseline of
expectations by which to identify or measure the benefit. No one can
tell why residential users have never bid on a lot (which might not have
been developed as residential housing even if rezoned), let alone the
magnitude of the price reduction that the manufacturer received as a
result of the zoning restriction.
The costs of invisibility are particularly high given the dynamics
of big city local politics. The reason is a lack of partisan competition.
Big city elections between different political parties are notoriously
noncompetitive, particularly for races other than mayor. The absence
of competition (and the weak tea of primary competition) reduces the
amount of monitoring of government abuse. As the amount big city
residents care about local politics is limited, the ease of finding things
out and explaining them is particularly important. If it cannot be
splashed on the cover of the New York Post, no one has an incentive
to find out about it.
Put together, these political costs are high. Subsidy programs or
tax abatements have to compete with other possible uses of local re-
sources from schools to roads. Legislators are able to make tradeoffs
between these uses, and interest groups and voters can mobilize sup-
port on behalf of one or another use. Thus, their value must at least
Exemption (NYC Independent Budget Office, Jan 2003), online at
http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/421aTaxFiscalBrief.pdf (visited Nov 8,2009).
71 See Hannah Fons and Amy Blankstein, Taxing Questions: A Look at J-51 and 421-a
Abatements, The Cooperator: Co-Op & Condo Monthly, online at
http://www.cooperator.com/articles/1378/1/Taxing-Questions (visited Nov 8,2009).
72 See David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections?
The Role of Election Law, 23 J L & Polit 419,422-25 (2007).
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pass the test of being more valuable to local politicians than additional
spending on popular causes like more police officers. Industrial reten-
tion does not have to go through this political crucible. As long as
noncumulative zoning makes the costs invisible to the public, there is
little political check to ensure that the costs of industrial retention do
not massively outweigh the benefits.
CONCLUSION
The simplest solution to the problem of noncumulative zoning is
simply to make such zones cumulative by permitting within them all
uses less noxious than industry. Land markets are hardly perfect me-
chanisms for allocating parcels among competing uses for land. Non-
cumulative zones, however, are highly unlikely to outperform even im-
perfect markets. As methods for abating nuisance lawsuits, such zones
go far beyond what is necessary to preserve the rational expectations of
industrial users. As mechanisms for subsidizing the industrial users'
costs of acquiring land, such zoning imposes extraordinary deadweight
losses-primarily elimination of housing opportunities-while making
no effort to target the cost reduction to those very specific industries
that are likely to generate spillover benefits for the city or region.
Rather than rely on this indiscriminate and inflexible device for
subsidizing industry, we suggest that the city rely on subsidies that ac-
tually are earmarked for businesses that produce the touted benefits.
Ideally, businesses would apply for grants based on their capacity to
generate intellectual or labor market spillovers, ensuring a program that
is maximally discriminating and subject to regular legislative review.
One might respond that such a subsidy-based system generates
deadweight losses of its own in the form of higher taxation needed to
generate the necessary revenue. Ideally, the city's system of taxation
would be able to tap the extra value created by cumulative zones by us-
ing the increase in property assessments generated by the looser zoning
restrictions to generate more revenue for (among other things) carefully
targeted industrial subsidies. In such an ideal tax system, landowners
could convert their land as of right to whatever use generated the highest
returns, and cities would tax the land based on the market value of a va-
cant parcel without respect to its actual use. Such a system would impose
little deadweight loss because the landowners' actions would not change
their tax liability. Unfortunately, most states' systems of property taxa-
tion deter such a rational system of revenue by limiting the ability of a
local government to tax certain types of property, either by under-
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assessing residential uses3 or by subjecting nonresidential uses to addi-
tional taxes from which residential users are exempt."
The best justification for noncumulative zones, in short, might be
that they provide a second-best solution to an artificially constrained
system of local government finance. By imposing conditions on the
rezoning of noncumulatively zoned land, a city can generate various
in-kind benefits that would be denied to the city if it allowed land to
convert as of right. As such, there is a theoretical case that, as a
second- (or third- or fourth-) best method of taxation, noncumulative
zoning theoretically might be defensible as a stopgap measure. How-
ever, the case for noncumulative zoning ought to rest on its rationality
as a (very odd) taxation measure, not its efficacy as a rational method
of subsidizing industrial land. Even if noncumulative zoning does
make sense as a tax measure (something there is good reason to be
skeptical of), it only does so because of the extreme pathologies of the
laws governing local taxation. The energy invested in its defense by
urban planners and city politicians would be more wisely devoted to
improving the municipal system of taxation so that cities would have
revenue to do precisely what noncumulative zones do so crudely-
retain industry that actually generates benefits worth subsidizing.
73 New York City, for instance, taxes single-family homes and small condos based on 6 percent of
their property value, but taxes large residential, commercial, and manufacturing properties based on 45
percent of the market value. See NYC Department of Finance, Determining the Annual Assessment
(2009), online at http://home.nyc.gov/html/dof/html/property/property-valassessmentshtml (visited
Nov 8, 2009). 'The tax rates are somewhat higher on single-family homes, but not enough to make a
particular difference given the difference in the tax bases. See NYC Department of Finance, Rates and
Other Charges (2009), online at http//home.nyc.gov/html/doflhtmlproperty/property-
ratesrates.shtml (visited Nov 8, 2009) (stating that single family homes taxed at 16.8 percent while
other tax rates are 13.1 percent, 12.6 percent, and 10.6 percent depending on type of use).
74 See NYC Department of Finance, Business and Excise Taxes (2009) online at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doflhtml/business/businessjtax-gct.shtml (visited Nov 8, 2009) (describ-
ing various commercial taxes in New York City).
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